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ABSTRACT: This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of
argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one
based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly
obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in
their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It seems apparent that there is a connection between the probative obligations (burdens of
proof) which arguers incur and their need to make manifest the rational adequacy of the
persuasive arguments they advance. This paper compares and contrasts two views of that
connection. The first view, which I will refer to as the status view, holds that the necessity
to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation is inherent in the practice of
argumentation and that arguers incur probative obligations in conjunction with that
necessity. According to this view, a speaker who purports to occupy the status of a
practitioner of argumentation necessarily strives to manifest the rational quality of her
argumentation and in doing so openly undertakes probative obligations (Johnson, 2000).
This view has been ably expressed by Ralph Johnson. The second view, to be referred to
as the interactionist view holds that the arguers find it pragmatically necessary to
manifest the rational adequacy of their argumentation in interactions which generate and
discharge probative obligations. This view finds its foundation in a Gricean view of the
pragmatics of speech acts (Kauffeld, 1998). These views have a number of features in
common. I will begin by elaborating key similarities between the status view and the
interactionist view and will, then, proceed to delineate their differences and comment on
their comparative adequacy.
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2. MANIFESTING AN ARGUMENT’S RATIONALITY AND THE ARGUER’S
PROBATIVE OBLIGATIONS
Let us begin with several key points of agreement shared by the two views in question.
First, both views focus on persuasive argumentation and hold, though on somewhat
different grounds, that (competent) persuasive arguers commonly strive not just to
provide rationally adequate arguments but also to manifest the adequacy of their
argumentation. Second, both views recognize that arguers commonly incur probative
obligations, i.e., the burden of providing good reasons for the propositions they put
forward for consideration and acceptance and (in many cases) the further obligation to
answer questions, objections, doubts, etc. As we will see the two views in question arrive
at these common observations from somewhat different perspectives.
Ralph Johnson holds that the practice of argumentation is characterized by
manifest rationality: “it is patently and openly rational . . . . [T]he participants . . . agree to
do nothing that would compromise either the substance or the appearance of rationality”
(Johnson, 2000 p. 163). As he later explains “. . . . participants in the practice of
argumentation not only exercise their rationality but they need to be seen to be doing so”
(p. 164). “Manifest rationality,” in Johnson’s view, is characteristic of the practice of
argumentation as conducted within an ideally rational community of arguers (p. 163).
Philosophical argumentation provides Johnson’s exemplar for such a practice.
In Johnson’s view the arguer’s probative obligations, what lawyers would call her
burden of proof, inhere in the demands of manifest rationality. Thus Ralph Johnson holds
The requirements of manifest rationality make it obligatory that, if I wish to persuade you of the
truth or the acceptability of some thesis-statement and wish to do so in accordance with the
dictates of rationality, recognizing your rationality, then I must give reasons . . . advanced in
support of the conclusion; what others call the premises of the argument. (p. 165)

To this he adds the further observation that there will in all likelihood be “objections to
the argument, whether to the thesis-target assertion, the reasons supporting or both.
Realizing this, the arguer, who we are supposing is rational, is under a rational obligation
to address these dialectical dimension: alternative positions, and standard objections” (p.
165).
The interactionist view holds that in a variety of communicative acts, such as
proposing, accusing, advising, exhorting, answering criticisms, insisting, etc. speaker’s
openly incur probative obligations as a matter of pragmatic efforts to establish conditions
under which arguments can function persuasively (Goodwin, 2001; Kauffeld, 1998). In
this view arguers find it necessary to manifest the rational quality of their arguments in
order to make it apparent that they are fulfilling their probative obligations. So, for
example, in making a proposal a speaker typically puts forward a proposition for
consideration, and in order to induce her addressee to at least tentatively consider that
proposition, the proposer openly commits herself to providing good reasons on its behalf
and to answering her addressee’s doubts, objections, etc. Often, where a proposer is able
to manifestly discharge that commitment, she is able create a body of argument which her
addressee believes merits serious consideration and which the addressee ought to
consider in making relevant decisions. Here the proposer’s burden of proof arises out of
the pragmatics of her interaction with her addressee, and the necessity to manifest the
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quality of her argumentation is a matter of her need to make it apparent that she is
fulfilling her openly incurred probative obligation.
The observation which these two points of view have in common, viz., that
competent arguers commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the
rational quality of their argumentation, can readily be illustration by critical examination
of much competent argumentation. Consider, for example, the introductory passage to
Martin Luther King’s brilliant “Letter from Birmingham Jail.”1 Addressing his “fellow
clergymen,” King wrote,
While confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement calling my
present activities ‘unwise and untimely.” Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of my work and
ideas. If I sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little
time for anything other than such correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no
time for constructive work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will and that your
criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statements in what I hope will be
patient and reasonable terms (2003, pp. 777).

Here King openly undertakes an obligation to respond in “patient and reasonable terms”
to the criticism directed at his actions by fellow clergymen. His letter is conspicuously
reasonable in its argumentation. His effort to manifest the rational quality of his argument
is reflected in his concluding statement.
If I have said anything in this letter that overstates the truth and indicates and unreasonable
impatience, I beg you to forgive me. If I have said anything that understates the truth and indicates
my having a patience that allows me to settle for anything less than brotherhood, I beg God to
forgive me (p. 794).

These features of King’s “Letter”—his openly undertaking a probative obligation and his
patent attempt to make manifest the rational quality of his argument—have clear parallels
in many instance of competent persuasive argumentation.
Recognition of the fact that in competent persuasive argumentation, speakers
commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the rational quality of their
argumentation sets the status view and the interactionist view apart from several other
approaches to the study of argumentation. It distinguishes them in the first instance from
the approach taken by Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. As I argue elsewhere, their
New Rhetoric holds that a speaker’s selection of arguments is governed fundamentally by
what we might call the Principle of Maxim Audience Adaptation (Kauffeld, 1995).
Regarding the principles which might guide a competent advocate in her selection of
arguments and proofs, they bluntly hold, "There is only one rule in this matter:
adaptation to the audience whatever its nature" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.
25). This view relegates consideration of the quality of available arguments to a
secondary role in the speaker's determination of which to use in her discourse. Matters
pertaining to the quality of reasons and arguments include the truth of available premises,
the validity and cogency of inferences, their relevance to the issues, their bearing on the
addressee's substantial interests and concerns, etc. The Principle of Maximum Audience
Adaptation relegates such considerations of quality to secondary status at best; following
1

For a concise history of the context of King’s “Letter” and an insightful discussion of it structure see:
Leff, M. (203).
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the maxim a speaker’s primary question is simply which arguments is my audience likely
accept. Whereas, it seems that in much competent persuasive discourse a speaker’s
selection of arguments would be guided by a need to identify reasons and evidence the
rational quality of which she can make apparent to her addressees.
Secondly, the status view and the interactionist view differ from accounts of
persuasive argumentation which construe the arguer’s burden of proof simply as a matter
of the would-be-persuader’s need to provide reasons in order to secure agreement, assent,
and/or consideration from his addressee (Baird, 1950, p. 26; Cronkhite, 1966, pp 273276; Ehninger & Brockriede, 1966, pp. 81-83). Such views regard arguments in
simplistically practical terms and fail to recognize that commonly arguers do incur
probative obligations; the arguer’s burden of proof in many cases is an obligation to
provide reason and evidence is support of her position.
Finally we should note that the status and the interactionist views contrast with
what we might call an “institutional view” of probative burdens. The latter, dominant in
much study of argumentation since Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, attempt to illuminate
ordinary burdens of proof primarily by analogy to the institutionally regimented
distributions of probative obligations found in courts of law (Whately, 1963, pp. 112132). While there is much to be learned from such analogies, both the status and the
interactionist views, as instanced in the literature under discussion here, hold that
accounts of probative obligations outside the courts should be built up primarily from
within the study of argumentation as ordinarily practiced and should not be simply
modeled on institutionalized legal practices (Johnson, 2000, pp. 48-49; Kauffeld, 1998).
3. COMPARISON OF THE STATUS AND THE INTERACTIONIST VIEWS
Let us now briefly sketch and then compare these perspectives on manifest rationality and
the arguer’s probative responsibilities. The basic question here is how well each
constructively illuminates these normative features of argumentation. That is, how well
does each fit with and explain the fact that competent arguers commonly incur probative
obligations and attempt to manifest the rational adequacy of their argumentation? And,
beyond that question, how well does each enhance our understanding of the normative
basis of argumentation? We start with the status view and proceed to the interactionist
view.
The status view presents manifest rationality and the arguer’s probative burdens
as products of expectations that arise within a set of “shared social understandings”
which, according to this view, enable the “practice of argumentation” (Johnson, 2000, p.
155). Exactly what those social understandings are and, indeed, determining what the
“practice of argumentation consists” in is a major project for Ralph Johnson and for
others inclined toward the status view of manifest rationality, and it may be that
conceiving of argumentation as a practice ultimately proves to be a happy way to
approach the study and conduct of arguments. However, our immediate concern is not
with this larger project but with the specific doctrines Professor Johnson has advanced
relating the practice of argumentation to manifest rationality and the arguer’s probative
burdens.
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Johnson conceives of a practice along lines inspired by Alasdiar MacIntyre (1984,
pp. 187-203). In MacIntyre/Johnson’s view a practice is:
(i) a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity (examples: the
games of football and chess; architecture, farming; the inquiries of physics, chemistry, biology,
history; in medieval times the sustaining of human communities; broadly: arts, sciences, games,
the sustaining of human families).
(ii) through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized (examples: goods internal to
chess include a particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination, competitive intensity; as
contrast with goods external to chess such as winning a prize for participating or for being
victorious; portrait painting has the internal good of showing how the face at any age is the face
that the subject of the portrait deserves). (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 189)

A critical feature of Johnson’s view of argumentation as a practice is the priority
he assigns to rationality as the primary internal good realized though the activity of
argumentation. Of the goods internal to the activity of argumentation, he writes:
The goods internal to the activity are generally an increase in rationality and specially a deeper
understanding, and-or being rationally persuaded, and-or coming closer to an acceptable position.
(p. 155),
An argument depends on the Other for its success and well-being. To understand this, we must go
back to the practice of argumentation and be reminded of its purpose(s). The fundamental purpose,
although admittedly not the only one, is to arrive at the truth about some issue. The practice exists
because everyone realizes that to achieve that goal, they need to reason; they need to give reasons
and then access them. (p. 158).

Consistent with this emphasis on promoting rationality Johnson offers the
following characterization of those fully committed to the practice of argumentation.
(i) They are devoted to rationality: “To engage in the practice, the participants must embrace and
endorse and to some degree cherish rationality. . . . Argumentation shares with other rational
processes—like proving and theorizing—the requirement that nothing be accepted but what is
shown to have reason behind it.” (p. 162)
(ii) Their primary aim is to increase rationality: “As a result of engaging in the practice of
argumentation, the participants are more rational and the amount of rationality in the world has
increased. The arguer and the critic have each exercised reasoning powers. . . . As a result of each
instance of argumentation, then, the world has become a slightly more rational place” (p. 162).
(iii) The practitioner of argumentation exhibits rationality. “It is not just that the participants
embrace rationality, which they might do secretly but not publicly. No, the participants in the
practice exhibit what it is to be rational. To give reasons; to weigh objections; to revise over them
or to reject them—all of this describes a vintage performance of rationality.” Correspondingly,
practitioners of argumentation regard breaches of rationality as “shocking.” (pp. 162-3)

It is relatively easy to see, how given these characteristics, the practitioners of
argumentation would each want to and find it necessary to manifest the rationality of
their argumentation. Each cherishes rationality and regards her argumentation as an
opportunity to exhibit the rationality of her arguments, and she would scorn failures of
rationality in the argumentation of her co-practitioners. She likewise expects that they
similarly cherish rationality and will strive to exhibit the rationality of their
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argumentation, scorning any failures of rationality in hers. In these circumstances there
arises a mutual expectation that arguers will not only present arguments which are
rational but will also strive to manifest the rationality of their argumentation. Indeed, in
these circumstances arguers will have reason to rely on each other to manifest the
rationality of each others argumentation.
Does this view of manifest rationality support an account of how arguers may
incur probative obligations both to give good reasons in support of the propositions to
which they try to persuade others and also to answer doubts and objections raised by
critics to the argument?
Although Professor Johnson has written at length about the arguer’s obligations
and especially her dialectical obligations, he has not to my knowledge committed himself
to any specific analysis of “obligation.” However, at this point we may turn to analysis of
obligation developed by the English philosopher Geoffrey Warnock. Professor Warnock
argues convincingly that obligations are incurred where: (i) it is foreseeable that others
will suffer or will continue to suffer harm in the event the obligee does not act; (ii) others
are counting on his or her acting in order to avert, prevent, ameliorate, or rectify that
harm; and (iii) he or she must so act in order to avoid speaking or having spoken or even
having acted falsely (Warnock, 1971, pp. 94-117). This is a somewhat more specific
sense of ‘obligation’ than one sometimes encounters. We sometimes speak of an
“obligation” in the broad sense of an act which one ought to do, and we sometimes speak
vaguely of obligations in ways which approximate our sense of ‘duty’ (for example:
Gewirth, 1978, pp. 135-137; Sher, 1987, pp. 196-197). But it is clear that there are many
things which one has a strong reason to do, and thus ought to do, but one is not bound to
do in the sense of having an obligation to do them. As George Sher observes, when we
say that an especially hard-working self-employed farmer deserves to succeed or a person
of fine moral character ought to fare well (and even suppose that we ought to support
their efforts), we typically do not mean that anyone is obligated to take steps to provide
what is deserved (Sher, 1987, p. 5). Similarly beneficence often indicates that we ought
help this or that person, though we may be under no obligation to do so (Warnock, 1971,
p. 94). While duties often give rise to obligations, the latter require some action which
tacitly or explicitly commits the obligee, such as accepting an office to which specific
duties are attached (Rawls, 1971, pp. 114-115; Warnock, 1971, p. 116). Thus, in
Warnock’s view, a promisor is obligated to do what she has promised because (a) others
are counting on her to so act, (b) would be frustrated in their coordinated actions should
the promise not be kept, and (c) the promisor has given the promisees to believe that she
will so act, if only because she said she would.
Given Warnock’s analysis of obligation, it seem clear that a speaker who presents
herself as a practitioner of argumentation in Johnson’s terms—who purports to cherish
argumentation, to increase and to exhibit rationality in her argumentation—will incur an
obligation to both provide good arguments for her position and answer doubts and
objections to that position: (1) other practitioners are expecting her, indeed relying on her
to provide arguments of manifestly good quality and to exhibit the rationality of her
position by answering doubts and objections, (2) they will suffer harm should she fail to
live up to their expectations, partly in that their valued practice of argumentation will not
have served to increase the amount of rationality and partly by being shocked and
disturbed by her failure, and (3) the arguer herself will have acted falsely in that by
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purporting to be a practitioner of argumentation, she generated the expectations which
have not been satisfied.
At this point in the discussion, then, we should recognize that Johnson’s version
of the status view does afford an explanation for why the practitioner of argumentation
(when addressing other practitioners) would both find it necessary to manifest the
rationality of her argumentation and would incur probative obligations. There are,
however, two closely related weaknesses to this account as it applies to the fact that
competent arguers commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the
rationality of their arguments.
From a normative point of view, a strength of Johnson’s account is its emphasis
on rationality as an internal good realized through the practice of argumentation.
Undoubtedly the capacity of argumentation to yield conclusions well founded on rational
grounds is among its most important values. However, given the fallibility of human
agents, rationality in argumentation is not the unalloyed primary good that Johnson’s
view of the practice of argumentation suggests. Here it is helpful to recall that when
Martin Luther King undertook the probative obligations which initiated his “Letter from
the Birmingham Jail,” he first announced that it was not his habit to answer all the
criticism which crossed his desk for he then “would have no time for constructive work.”
This remark may serve as a healthy reminder that the exercise of reason in argumentation
requires substantial commitments of scarce cognitive resources; prudent individuals are
unlikely to commit themselves to such exercises unless they foresee a good chance that
the effort will result in some positive outcome (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1992, p. 38). They
will often be unwilling or very reluctant to commit the time, research, and expenditure of
effort required by argumentation without some strong assurance that the argumentation
will be conducted within limits that enable an outcome which warrants the effort. In
addition, argumentation often puts the arguer at considerable risk. Johnson, himself,
recognizes that even among the well intentioned arguing is a risky business: “But it is
also known full well that intellectual imaginations may be limited, that there may be a
failure to see certain limitations in the arguments produced. In eagerness, certain items of
evidence may be overrated and others may be underrated or ignored” (p. 158). 2
Reflecting this simple fact that rationality as exercised in argumentation by fallible
persons is an imperfect instrument, addressees may regard arguments addressed to them
as potentially meddlesome, misguided intrusions into their affairs. Similarly, person
suspected of wrongdoing may prudently doubt whether their answers to the complaints
brought against them will receive fair and dispassionate consideration. Then, too, even
flattering arguments may seem to pose a distasteful potential to distort one’s own selfregard. Rationality for all its inherent value is subject to abuse, error and misapplication,
even among the well intentioned.
Given the liabilities of rationality, it should come as no surprise that in a great
many cases persons who value argumentation and regard as it an potentially useful
process are, nonetheless, unwilling to undertake the fulsome commitment rationality
2

It should be noted that Professor Johnson makes this observation about the vulnerability of argumentation
to error in the course of pointing up the importance of dialectical responses which can serve to correct the
errors made by the argument’s initial sponsor. While it is true that dialectical exchanges may serve to
correct errors; it is also the case that the responses a critic makes to one’s argument may be no less subject
to error than one’s initial statement.
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Johnson attributes to the practitioner of argument. King, it will be recalled, restricts
himself to defending the wisdom and timeliness of his actions as leader of non-violent
protests at Birmingham; he does not commit himself to answering all criticisms addressed
to his cause, and he commits himself only to such exercise of reason as is consistent with
recognition that years of racial injustices warrant considerable impatience. King’s
example is not unique. In a great many cases a speaker’s willingness to undertake a
burden of proof is prudently (and reasonably) qualified by considerations which seriously
limit the speaker’s interest in “increasing the total rationality of human affairs.” Parties
putting forward propositions for consideration and manifestly willing to defend their
positions commonly restrict their commitment to respond to only to those questions and
objections which recognize the urgency of the matter or, alternatively, to those which
respect the preliminary state of the project. Persons to whom potentially meddlesome
argument are addressed may require a commitment from the arguer to consider the matter
primarily in terms of their concerns. Persons suspected of wrong-doing may require
special commitments regarding the fairness of the argumentation in which they are
invited to participate. And parties to whom laudatory arguments are addressed may
require special assurance regarding a speaker’s motivations. Very commonly in day-today argumentation the probative obligations which enable argumentation to do useful
work require that the speaker restrict, qualify, or otherwise limit her commitment to
rationality in ways which are not compatible with the commitment which, according to
Johnson, identify a speaker as a practitioner of argumentation.
It is important to be clear about the difficulty these considerations pose for
Johnson’s account of the arguer’s probative obligations and, indeed, for all status views
of those obligations. The problem is not just that Johnson fails to recognize that
argumentation serves many ends and that it may be associated with many goods besides
rationality. The difficulty is that Johnson’s status view cannot account for many of the
probative obligations arguers do ordinarily incur, nor does it cast much light on how
those obligations are undertaken. As we have seen, in Johnson’s view a speaker incurs
probative obligations by presenting herself as a practitioner of argumentation, i.e., as one
who cherishes rationality, openly embraces and endorse rationality, accepting nothing but
what is shown to have reason behind it, striving to maximize the amount of rationality in
the world, scorning limitations on the exercise of rationality, and seeking to exhibit what
it is to be rational. It is this self-representation which warrants the supposition that she
will have acted or spoken falsely should she fail to satisfy her probative obligations and,
so, seals her commitment as an obligation. This account may be satisfactory for some
kinds of argumentation, i.e., argumentation exchanged among persons who share a
similar conception of the practice of argumentation and for whom rationality is the
primary good to be pursued. But given the fallibility of persons, the vulnerability of
rationality to abuse and error, and the prudential costs of argumentation, many arguers
would, like Martin Luther King, avoid openly undertaking the sweeping commitment to
rationality which for Johnson identifies the practitioner of argumentation. Accordingly,
on Johnson’s account they would not in good faith be able to undertake the probative
obligations which, in fact, many arguers do authentically incur on a day-to-day basis.
The problem for Johnson’s account of manifest rationality and probative
obligation is that it makes the self-representation required to engage the arguer’s burden
of proof categorical: the arguer represents herself as a member of a category of persons
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with a specific and identifying set of commitments to rationality; whereas, many of the
burdens of proof incurred by persons on a day-to-day basis in the actual practice of
argumentation are variable depending on the problems, opportunities, risks, etc. which
persons reasonably and prudently anticipate and encounter when they engage in arguing
with one another. Nor is it readily apparent that a party representing herself as a
practitioner of argumentation has room to modify the probative burden she is expected to
accept. However she identifies herself, if that identification suffices to mark her as a
practitioner of argumentation, her fellow practitioners are thereupon entitled to expect
that she shares their regard for and commitment to rationality, and relying on this
expectation they will suffer harm should she fail to accept and live up to that burden, and
it will be the case that she has acted falsely if she fails to conform her behaviour to this
expectation. On Johnson’s account, once one purports to occupy the status of practitioner
of argumentation, a corresponding full fledged and unqualified obligation to promote
rationality descends on the arguer.
Let us turn now to the interactionist’s view of the arguer’s probative obligations
and to its account of her need to manifest the rationality of her position. This view also
traces the genesis of an arguer’s probative burdens to socially established expectations,
but it presents a very different picture of those expectations and of how and why they
arise. Like the status view, the interactionist regards argumentation as a useful practice
capable of bringing reason and evidence to bear on the resolution of a many matters, but
unlike the status view, the interaction perspective does not suppose a priori that
argumentation is governed by an overriding commitment to rationality which identifies
its practitioners and dictates their probative obligations. Rather the interactionist analyzes
the kinds communicative exchanges in which arguers incur probative obligations with
special attention to how those commitments are undertaken, how they may be realigned
in particular cases, how they vary from one kind of interaction to another, and the
pragmatic roles which probative obligations play in argumentation.
Thus, the interactionist observes that in many communicative acts, e. g.,
proposing, responding to criticism, (some varieties of) advising, speakers deliberately and
openly accept probative obligations, while in many others, e. g., accusing, insisting,
exhorting, criticizing, they place themselves in positions at which they can be called upon
to undertake probative obligations. As noted above, the proposer typically puts forward a
proposition for (tentative) consideration and openly commits herself both to providing
reasons which justify its acceptance and to answering her addressee’s doubts and
objections. The accuser, typically, demands an answer to her allegations of wrong doing
and, by openly committing herself to treating the accused fairly, places herself in a
position where she must accept an obligation to support her allegations should she be
called upon to do so. The advisor openly commits herself to speaking out of regard for
her addressee’s concerns, and she may also openly undertake to provide reasons for
following her advice. King, it will be recalled, explicitly committed himself to answering
the criticisms of his actions in patient and reasonable terms. In these and similar
communicative exchanges, arguers incur probative burdens which satisfy Warnock’s
conception of obligations: the arguer says and does things which foreseeably provide her
addressees with a basis for relying upon her to provide reason and evidence of a specific
quality; the addressees will suffer corresponding harm should she fail to live up to those
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expectations; and she will have spoken or acted falsely if argumentation does not fulfill
her commitment.
The probative obligations speakers undertake interactively make are related in
various ways to presumptions which warrant participation in reason-giving exchanges
which otherwise might not be possible (Kauffeld, 1998). Under favourable
circumstances, the proposer’s probative commitment warrants a presumption that what
she has to say may prove to merit serious consideration and, so, may provide an
addressee with reason to engage in dialogue about and give careful consideration to
propositions which he otherwise might suppose not worth a serious cognitive investment.
Similarly, the accuser’s commitment to treat the accused fairly and her concomitant
willingness to substantiate her allegations may suffice to oblige the accused to participate
in a discussion which the accused would otherwise avoid. The advisor’s open
commitment to speak out of regard for her addressee’s concerns and, accordingly, frame
her arguments from that perspective may serve to warrant a presumption to the effect that
her arguments will not be meddlesome and, so, serve to engage the attention of an
addressee who would otherwise ignore her arguments. King’s probative commitments
seem well designed to warrant a presumption that his answers rise above a context of
inflamed and impassioned diatribes and, so, merit careful and thoughtful consideration.
Here we can see a comparative strength of the interactionist views of probative
obligation. Where the status view presents rationality as the prime good in argumentation
and seems to neglect the various reasons why persons may be reluctant to engage in
argumentation principally designed to promote rationality, the interactionist view brings
to attention ways in which the allocation of probative obligations can serve to provide
persons with reason to participate fruitfully in rational argumentation. An interactionist
view enables us to see how in much day-to-day argumentation an appropriate distribution
of probative obligations enables persons to square the value of reasoned discourse with
practical consideration of time and urgency, fairness, independence of decision-making,
and so on.
Moreover, an interactionist view helps us to understand some of the importance of
manifest rationality in argumentation, and this in two respects. First, the interactionist
view calls attention to the fact that commonly speakers deliberately and openly commit
themselves to providing rational support for propositions they put forward for acceptance
and, also, to answering doubts, objections, counter-arguments, etc. They do so for good
practical reasons related to the possibility of engaging others in argumentation. Second,
by manifesting the rational adequacy of their arguments, speakers can conspicuously and
openly discharge the probative obligations they incur, and in many cases, as I have
argued elsewhere, manifestly fulfilling those obligations has considerable pragmatic
value (Kauffeld, 2002). King’s address provides an interesting example of the pragmatic
value of conspicuously discharging a probative obligation. His letter falls into two parts.
The first responds to the criticism directed against him by fellow clergymen (pp. 777784). It provides a carefully reasoned body of argument which persuasively vindicates the
protest activity for which he had been criticized and which very plausibly defends his
status as patient, sincere and well intentioned Christian minister—a fellow clergyman.
Having presumptively discharged his initial probative obligation, the second part of his
letter expresses his disappointment with the failure of his white ministerial brothers, and
of “moderates” in general, to support non-violent protest activities on the behalf of black
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civil rights (pp. 784-794). The overall structure of his appeal repeats this form: King
expresses his disappointment at the failure of the white clergy to support this or that
aspect of Black demands and actions for civil rights. He purports to have expected their
support as a matter of their avowal of Christian doctrines. Having presumptively
established his status as a patient and reasonable man of good faith, King uses that status
as platform from which to impose an obligation on his fellow clergy to answer for their
failure to support his cause. He is suffering harm in the form of profound disappointment,
resulting from that failure on their part to fulfill expectations, which they as professed
Christian leaders had aroused in King’s breast. So, the interactionist view sheds light on
the arguers need to manifest the rationality of her arguments.
Now, we come to what might be regarded as a troubling aspect of the
interactionist view, for it may seem that the interactionist fails to support a sufficiently
rigorous normative conception of the burden of proof. Legal conceptions of the burden of
proof hold up a model which offers relatively clear conceptions of when in, for example,
criminal cases the prosecution will have discharged its burden of proof, viz., when the
prosecution has established the defendant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
Johnson’s (initial) formulation of the status view of an arguer’s probative obligation is
even more rigorous. The arguer is obliged to provide positive reason for the
proposition(s) she want accepted and to answer all doubts, objections, etc. known to her
and to others (Johnson, 2000, pp. 269-270). The interactionist view also supports a
normative conception of the arguer’s probative obligation, but it’s conception is far less
rigid than some legal conceptions or the status conception developed by Johnson. Indeed,
the interactionist’s strength depends upon the possibility of engaging probative
obligations appropriate to the nature of the argumentation at hand and the circumstances
in which it will be conducted. Accordingly, a proposer will typically commit herself to
answer all doubts and objections which in the circumstances merit consideration, and
under conditions of urgency this standard may allow her to dismiss many objections,
which in other circumstances might be considered quite important. Similarly, an advisor
speaking in an imperative mode might accept a probative obligation limited to showing
that such and such a course of action is required by what the advisee should regard as an
overriding concern. Similarly, we have seen that King limited his probative obligations to
questions concerning whether his actions were timely and wise. This apparent variation in
the normative standards associated with probative responsibilities negotiated in the
course of argumentative interaction may seem to lack the rigor necessary to ensure
epistemic reliability.
I am unsure as to the extent of difficulty posed by the preceding concern. No
doubt allocations of probative responsibility are subject to abuse. Richard Gaskin’s has
shown that there is a possibility in some situations of advocates attempting to win a
decision by imposing on the other side a burden of proof which could not be satisfied
regardless of the merits of the opposing position’s argumentation (Gaskins, 1992). And
there can be no doubt that much contemporary advertising attempts to induce
consideration of product purchases on be basis of deceptive probative commitments. On
the other hand, the probative obligations incurred in paradigm cases of various
communicative acts do commit advocates to rigorous argumentation. The proposer’s
commitment to provide a case which merits serious consideration imposes a demanding
standard on her argumentation. Moreover, the question of how comprehensive an
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arguer’s probative burdens ought be is more complicated than might at first appear.
Students of argumentation are accustomed to think of argumentation as a process which
terminates in a judgment, decision, or consensus. Accordingly we conceive of an
allocation of probative burdens spanning a bounded process such as a court proceeding,
an academic debate, or regulated dialogue. In “real life” much argumentation is far more
fragmentary than our idealized processes suggest. King’s “Letter” constitutes one episode
in a dialogue about race and social action which continues to the present. It explicitly
aims at tolerance for and understanding of certain protest activities; its likely immediate
result was to get some people to begin to rethink their views. The question of what are
epistemically satisfactory probative commitments, then, is a complicated one—one which
requires far more study and investigation.
Finally, I should like to briefly address the question of whether a status view of
manifest rationality and an interactionist view can be merged. Perhaps, one might be
inclined to think, the flexibility of the interactionist view could be given more spine, so to
speak, were it merged with a status view along the lines put forward by Johnson. If the
relevant status is taken to be the status of a practitioner of argumentation, such a merger
is not easy to conceive. Such a proposal could only achieve sufficient generality by
attaching some minimal core probative obligation to the very act of attempting to produce
an argument. In view of the range of purposes argumentation serves and the variety of
circumstances under which it is conducted, I doubt that such a universal core
commitment could be formulated which assured much rigor in argumentation. There are,
however, other ways in which considerations of status may enter the picture. King
addresses his argumentation to sincere persons of good will. Insofar as his arguments
qualify as considerations which merit the attention of sincere persons of good will, then
failure to address his views leaves persons vulnerable to questions about whether they are
indeed such properly motivated persons. In the eighteenth century, gentlemen commonly
addressed their arguments to a “candid audience” and presented themselves as persons of
candour, i.e., persons willing to attend carefully and respond reasonably to opposing
views. Failure to conduct oneself in this fashion raised the possibility of being criticized
for lack of candour, and that criticism was often taken seriously (Furtwangler, 1979). In
these instances a general status related to civility figures into the conception and
enforcement of argumentative commitments. Were we to find ways to merge status
considerations in our conception of argumentative obligations, the productive merger
would, I suspect, involve concepts of status having to do with civility and proper respect
for persons and not specifically with the practice of argumentation.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has compared a status account of the connections between manifest rationality
and the arguer’s probative burdens with the account given from an interactionist
perspective. According to the former, persons purporting to be practitioners of
argumentation attempt to, and are expected to, exhibit the rationality of their
argumentation, while regarding the promotion of rationality as the primary internal good
of their practice. As a consequence of this commitment, “practitioners of argumentation”
incur an obligation both to provide good reasons for the propositions they put forward for
acceptance and to answer questions and objections addressed to them. According to an
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interactionist view, arguers deliberately and openly undertake probative obligations
strategically in order to generate presumptions which warrant participation in
argumentative interactions. In this view arguers take pains to manifest the rationality of
their argumentation because by so doing (a) they openly and strategically undertake
probative obligations and (b) they make it apparent that they are fulfilling those
obligations. The status view, I have argued, has a limited capacity to account for the
probative obligations incurred in day-to-day argumentation because it does afford the
“practitioner of argumentation” with means to adapt her probative commitments to the
complexities of the situations in which argumentation occurs. The interactionist view, on
the other hand, affords insight into how arguers use the resources of manifest rationality
to create circumstances in which argumentation can function.
link to commentary
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